The Oslo paradigm can restore Israel’s legitimacy - opinion
'I believe that there is much to be learned from the insights and achievements of the Rabin government some 30 years ago', the author says.
The Oslo Declaration of Principles was approved and signed on August 19, 1993, in the presence of Israeli foreign minister Shimon Peres. This was followed by an exchange of letters between prime minister Yitzhak Rabin and PLO chief Yasser Arafat announcing their mutual recognition of each other’s political standing. On September 13, on the grounds of the White House, the Oslo Accords were officially signed.
In a follow-up interview in the Davar newspaper on September 29, Rabin explained that “as far as Israel is concerned, the test will be their (the PLO’s) ability to maintain public order and prevent terrorist attacks by extremist elements who seek to undermine the whole process, mainly by Hamas and the Palestinian rejectionist fronts.”
The Accords set out a number of aspirational objectives which, in the short term, were intended to be defined as steps toward the realization of a new political reality in Gaza and the West Bank. Thus, following the Washington ceremony, over a period of months teams of specialists in different fields representing both sides met in unannounced locations in Egypt, Norway, France, and Switzerland. At the conclusion of this process, a detailed document known as the Gaza-Jericho Agreement was approved.
Following this, the Rabin government announced that thereafter, negotiations would be based on the principle of territorial compromise. And to underline this step, prime minister Rabin announced a freeze of all expenditures in the territories.
To the satisfaction of the Rabin-led government, public opinion polls revealed that 75% of the Palestinian population in the territories expressed support for the process, and 65% of Israel’s population did as well.
The Oslo roadmap
The Oslo Accords was not meant to be a comprehensive description of a peace agreement but rather a kind of road map for negotiations and a guide for implementation. The outstanding issues requiring resolution included the question of final borders; status of Jerusalem; security arrangements; and the status of the Palestinian Arab refugees. The first priority, however, was the need to clarify the process and timing of the transfer of territory and control from Israel to Palestinian bodies.By agreement, the process began with the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip and the city of Jericho on the West Bank. In principle, this was meant to be the beginning of a process that would include most of the West Bank. The planned transfer of authority was intended to continue over a period of years. And throughout, special attention was to be given to the security implications of each step.
The world was surprised. The Oslo Accords represented a dramatic change in policy, suggesting an end to the violent Israel-Palestinian conflict. The realization that Israel was prepared to give up its claim to most of the territories in return for a peaceful resolution of the conflict was, in the eyes of many, a counterintuitive development.
This historic turn of events introduced a period of unprecedented international interest in communicating with Israel and in establishing formal relations with the Jewish state. With this came many new economic developments including trade, foreign investments, and a huge increase in foreign tourism. In fact, the numbers were quite extraordinary. As of 1991, following years of boycott and rejection, Israel had diplomatic relations with 85 countries. But by 1995, following the signing of the Oslo Accords and the implementation of its initial phases, Israel had established formal relations with 161 countries. This phenomenon expressed itself in several exhausting years in which Israel was inundated with state visits.
The offices of the prime minister and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were overwhelmed by visiting presidents, prime ministers, and foreign ministers from countries establishing diplomatic relations or representing countries renewing lapsed relations with Israel. A consequence of many of these visits was the signing of dozens of multilateral agreements of economic and political consequence.
Foreign investments increased from a modest several hundred thousand shekels ($72 million) in 1992 to NIS 6.4 billion ($2.1 billion) in 1995. Tourism increased by nearly two and a half times the number of 951,000 in 1991 to, in 1995, a total of 2,214,600.
In general, Israel’s economic picture improved sharply due to a combination of the change in priorities from allocating large amounts of money in the territories, to the domestic needs of Israeli society. Budgets increased dramatically. For example, the Israeli budget for education increased from NIS 7.5 billion in 1991 to NIS 17.5 billion in 1995. And, at the university level, the number of students absorbed by the system increased from 78,640 to 146,000 in 1995.
The budget for health services increased from NIS 1.186 billion in 1991 to NIS 2.470 billion in 1995. Investment in infrastructure resulted in an increase by 1995 of more than 1,000 km. of roads within the Green Line. Investment in industry doubled to NIS 7.7 billion in 1995. The number of Israeli unemployed fell from 11% in 1992 to 6.5% in 1995. In fact, overall, the Israeli economy grew between 1992 and 1995 at a record 23.8%.
One area of special note in the budgeting process was the Israeli Arab sector. There, after years of neglect and inadequate support, the government committed to make substantial efforts to close the gap between the Arab and Jewish communities. During his political campaign in the lead-up to national elections, Rabin demonstratively visited Arab communities, speaking often of his commitment to address the unmet needs of the Israeli Arab sector. Indeed, he reaffirmed his position when he addressed the Knesset for the first time as prime minister on July 13, 1992.
To Rabin’s credit, he continued to address the subject. In one unique setting, he did so when giving a speech to IDF officers at their graduation ceremony at the National Security College in August 1993.
There, he described his timetable for realizing his social and economic plans for the Arab sector. He said: “By the end of this century, we want to live in a Jewish state, in which there is also an Arab minority with equal rights, which encompasses within its experience thousands of years of history, in the course of which our spiritual, religious, and political image was formulated.”
And when the Prime Minister’s Office regularly reported on the government’s progress, it included a long list of the achievements in the Arab sector. Also mentioned were those not yet accomplished.
Implementation of the program in the Arab sector was coordinated through an inter-ministerial planning process. Its mandate was to reduce the gap in the development of infrastructure and to allocate substantial new resources to address the unmet needs of Israel’s Arab population. Every ministry was expected to substantially increase its allocations and services to the Arab sector and to regularly report on its action. Each ministry was also expected to report on the number of Arab staff working in each department of the ministry in question.
In a survey of Arab opinion regarding the achievements of the Labor-led government from 1992 through 1995, the overwhelming majority of Arab citizens reported that government policy did indeed result in a positive change in treatment of the Arab sector. This was confirmed by the 75.5% of the residents of Arab towns and cities throughout the country, as well as by 89% of the Bedouin living in the North and 62.5% of the Bedouin in the Negev.
An interesting and significant byproduct of Rabin’s constructive relationship with Israeli Arabs was the impact it had over a period of years on the attitudes and self-definition of Israel’s Arab citizens. In a process that was followed by a number of Israeli social scientists, beginning well before Rabin was elected but which spiked in the early 1990s, was the incorporation of an “Israeli” component to the self-definition of those surveyed. Scholars such as Sammy Smooha and Eli
Rekhes reported on what they described to be a process of Israelization among Israeli Arabs citizens. This expresses itself in the way a majority of Arab Israelis self-defined themselves as “Israeli Arab” or “Arab Israeli” or “Palestinian Israeli.”
The most revealing example was that 69.8% of those surveyed in 1995 declared that in the conduct of their daily lifestyle, they are more like Israeli Jews than the Arabs living in the territories.
In contrast to the self-definition and attitudes of the Israeli Arab population, Rabin expressed his concern over what he described as the lack of understanding by the Israeli public on matters relating to Hamas. “I think that many people in Israel do not understand the serious nature of the extremist Islamic terrorists, the measure of insanity inherent in their beliefs, their willingness to bear casualties, pain, and hardship…” (Maariv, April 14, 1995).
In explaining further why he supported the Oslo process, he said: “I entered the process with a clear mind because the alternative was either to find another Palestinian partner, with all its limitations, or to leave the situation intact, in which the extremist Islamic elements would increase their power and seize control over the Palestinians in the territories, which would leave us without any chance of a political solution” (Kol Yisrael, 29 April 29, 1995).
The Oslo process was by definition slow and complicated by events in and around Israel and the territories. It was not until September 24, 1995, that the very detailed and substantive Oslo II agreement was completed and signed in Egypt.
Days later in Washington, D.C., in the presence of US president Bill Clinton, Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak, Jordan’s King Hussein, PLO chairman Yasser Arafat, and prime minister Yitzhak Rabin, the Oslo II Accords was signed.
The Oslo II Accords consisted of over 300 pages including five chapters with 31 articles, and an additional seven annexes and nine maps. The central issue agreed upon included a description of the process of gradualism by which Israel would withdraw from additional territories in favor of control by the Palestinian Authority, as well as mutual security arrangements. In sum, nearly every conceivable factor in the civil and national life of the emerging Palestinian entity was addressed by the joint Israeli and Palestinian working teams who prepared the Oslo II documents. Included was the division of the West Bank into three “temporary” divisions; Zones A, B, and C.
Rabin presented the Oslo II interim agreement to the Knesset for approval on October 5, 1995. The opposition parties led by the Likud and supported by significant numbers of their followers and religious extremists undertook a vehement program of rejectionism and vicious, threatening propaganda against Rabin, his associates, and followers.
Hamas carried out a wave of terrorist attacks to show its violent opposition to the peace process. And while the Oslo II interim agreement was approved, just a month later on November 4, 1995, Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated.
Subsequently, over a period of years, the entire Oslo process was subverted by political manipulation and opposition.
Egregious history may repeat itself when nations choose not to learn from their own experience. As regards Israel, I believe that there is much to be learned from the insights and achievements of the Rabin government some 30 years ago – above all, with regard to the benefits and challenges of our current search for security, peace, regional reconciliation, international legitimacy and support. ■
Stanley Ringler served as director of the Israel Labor Party American Desk and worked in support of the policies and programs of prime ministers Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres, and Ehud Barak.
