How Netanyahu deflects blame while manipulating Israel into trusting him - comment

Now, as the trial is going on, he is pushing off every session as much as he possibly can. He rightfully contended that he cannot be both a prime minister and under criminal investigation. Although he meant it in the sense that as much of the case must be dropped or pushed off as possible, a large portion of the Israeli public saw it in a different light: his accidentally admitting that he needs to resign, as any prime minister who was under indictment had done before him.

He now has one of the greatest tragedies in the history of the Jewish state on his hands, and there, too, he is trying to wipe them clean. To be fair, the security systems in Israel are largely to blame; nevertheless, even the basic understanding that defense maneuvers are largely impacted by policy has been swept under the carpet by the prime minister.

How Netanyahu has played the blame game

The coalition, in general, has done an impressive job of simultaneously bashing the IDF to no end while nevertheless maintaining their stake over total support for Israel’s security systems. These are the same people who have bragged to the international community about Israel’s unparalleled defense capabilities.

It is deeply upsetting to see them use the organization they claim to support on a broad scale and bash it to no end for political gain, but hey, that’s the business.

But this month opened up with a truly unparalleled level of denial and lack of accountability, and it ended up being a messy, highly public dispute that should have remained a private discussion. Instead, it has become a spectacle of disorganization and barely controlled anger.

The controversy began when the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) released findings from its internal investigation into the failures that led to the October 7 massacre. The agency took significant responsibility, acknowledging that it failed to recognize Hamas as a well-organized military force rather than a scattered extremist group. This misjudgment led to critical intelligence blind spots, particularly in prioritizing threats from the West Bank over Gaza.

One key revelation was that Israeli security forces dismissed the activation of numerous Israeli SIM cards by Hamas, as similar incidents in the past had not led to attacks.

The report also seemingly pointed fingers at Netanyahu and his right-wing coalition, suggesting that policies related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – such as prison conditions for terrorists, restrictions on Temple Mount visits, and judicial reforms – may have contributed to Hamas’s decision to attack.

Netanyahu, whose primary focus has seemingly not been the ceasefire talks, the policy for the support of hostage and bereaved families, or the return of said hostages but rather deflecting blame for October 7, responded with outright defiance.

Instead of accepting any blame, he and his allies sought to shift responsibility onto the Shin Bet, the IDF, and previous governments. Reports later revealed that he had delayed forming the external committee for the Shin Bet probe for four months. When the agency requested more time to complete its findings, Netanyahu rejected the request and pushed for a rushed report.

While the Shin Bet has already implemented major changes, it warned that unless there is better coordination between political and defense leaders, another large-scale attack could happen.

Rather than acknowledging these warnings, Netanyahu’s inner circle quickly blamed Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar for the failures. They claimed that Hamas had no real intention to escalate and that Bar had even suggested offering economic benefits to Hamas in exchange for calm. Shin Bet sources later dismissed these claims as complete fabrications.

This is the same reason that Netanyahu and his government now fervently oppose a state commission of inquiry into the events of October 7, 2023. When speaking to the Knesset plenum shortly after the Shin Bet report was revealed, he demanded that the commission of inquiry not have any political biases: “Not a commission whose conclusions are predetermined, already written.”

Ironically, this is the exact concern the opposition has expressed toward the coalition’s preferred method of investigation: a government-led commission of inquiry in which members of the coalition may choose what evidence to include and what to turn a blind eye to.

It is always an us-or-them mentality with Netanyahu, and he communicates that impressively to his camp of supporters. It was us or them against his political opponents when the criminal investigation began; it was us or them when looking for whom to blame for October 7 in contrast to the Shin Bet and the IDF; and it has always been us or them in the explanations for war against Hamas.

But the least surprising has been the consistent us-or-them against the High Court, and it ties back to the judicial reform controversy. Making an enemy out of the court – surrounding his trial, the judicial reform, and the commission of inquiry – is meant to sow the seeds of doubt in the Israeli public so that eventually the reforms may seize control and limit the checks and balances so desperately needed in our already fragile democracy.

What the Israeli citizens need to do now, in short, is not let themselves become so traumatized that they would take the word of a leader whose reliability has been put into question time and time again.

After all, we deserve better.