The IDF released several reports over the past few days, investigating its role in the failures that led to October 7, as well as its management in the first few days following the attack. These probes cover everything from the lead-up to the attack, the IDF’s response and also individual battles. While the investigations are thorough, they leave many questions unanswered, as does the recent Shin Bet (Israel Security Service) report on the same subject.
On the one hand, the IDF and Shin Bet have admitted failures, but on the other hand, there is lack of clarity on how Israel’s security establishment should have done better prior to October 7. This is because the reports, so far, suffer from a “forest for the trees” problem. The overall forest of failure on October 7 relate to large themes, such as the complacency and arrogance that underpinned Israel’s Gaza policy; the details revealed in the investigations make this clear. They relate to problems such as the IDF not practicing to defend bases and posts along the border in the case of a mass attack. This left bases, like Nahal Oz, without the proper defenses. The bases were exposed, didn’t have enough armed combat soldiers to defend them, and the brigades and division command seemed overwhelmed.
The Shin Bet said that the “organization failures” have been examined and that lessons have been learned. Yet it also said – before – that it had a deep understanding of Hamas. So, what went wrong?
