Wild word games between Iran, US about what is nuke 'enrichment' - analysis
Of course, allowing and blocking uranium enrichment are polar opposites, so the two by definition cannot coexist – or can't they?
On April 12, the US and Iran held their first round of nuclear talks under the Trump administration and the first serious negotiations between Washington and Tehran since September 2023.
Since then, both US President Donald Trump and Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, have been desperately searching for a formula that would allow a deal both sides could live with.
Many issues have been resolved, but one key dispute that the sides are dancing around and inventing new terms and phrases to try to solve it is how to both allow and block low-level Iranian uranium enrichment.
Of course, allowing and blocking uranium enrichment are polar opposites, so the two, by definition, cannot coexist – or can they?
The first wild formula has the Islamic Republic giving up all uranium enrichment for one to three years – a symbolic period – followed by being allowed to enrich uranium at 3.67%, a low level, similar to the 2015 Obama administration’s Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action nuclear deal.
Next, the latest wacky formula being discussed is a consortium of Middle East nuclear cooperation among Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Turkey, and possibly others, with the US managing the joint venture.
This would either lead to Iran enriching uranium with its own centrifuges, but not on its territory, or enriching uranium on its territory in collaboration with other countries to dilute its actions, or a mix of these arrangements on an island where Iran and other countries also have disputed claims.
There are also some potential points regarding improved inspector access to nuclear facilities and possibly the shutdown of some underground facilities (but not their destruction).
WHAT ALL of these creative arrangements have in common is that they are focused on symbolic victories for both Trump and Khamenei without seriously getting into the essence of what most endangers Israel about Iran’s nuclear program.
Iran's advanced centrifuges makes nuclear program more dangerous
In truth, what is most dangerous about the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program is its fleet of advanced centrifuges.It is not irrelevant whether these centrifuges are operating or in storage – it is undoubtedly better to have them not operating.
But as long as they are not destroyed, Khamenei, at any moment, can order them out of storage, and these machines are so efficient that they could get Iran back to where it is now in terms of nuclear enrichment in a matter of months.
This point was aptly illustrated by the IAEA’s report on Tehran’s nuclear enrichment progress this past weekend, which most of the world completely misunderstood.
In public, Israel, like most of the world, wrongly focused on the fact that the quantity of the Islamic Republic’s enriched uranium had reached the high 60% level, according to the IAEA – enough for around 10 potential nuclear weapons.
But that was not the real danger that was exposed by the report.
When the last one was published three months ago, Iran had enough uranium for at least a potential six or so nuclear weapons in conservative estimates, and according to some hawks, already enough for close to 10 nuclear weapons.
Yet, Israel’s problem is not six vs 10 nuclear weapons, but whether Iran has even one.
Preventing Khamenei from obtaining even one nuclear weapon is the reason why a record number of top Israeli defense officials want a green light to strike Tehran’s nuclear facilities while they are at the most vulnerable they have been in decades due to the success of Jerusalem’s October 26, 2024, strike that destroyed Iran’s best air defenses.
So what was most disturbing was that the IAEA report showed Iran could enrich enough 60% uranium for three to four nuclear weapons in only three months using its advanced centrifuges.
No one can say that warnings about what these advanced centrifuges could do if taken out of storage in the future are theoretical. This worst-case scenario has already happened, as confirmed by the apolitical IAEA.
As long as Khamenei’s advanced centrifuges are not destroyed, any wild or wacky words that he or Trump use to nail down a tightrope formula for a deal on Iran enriching uranium will be more about each of those leaders saving face than about protecting Israel over any lengthy period of time.
